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CASE HISTORIES OF EARTHEN DAM FAILURES
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Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi, India

ABSTRACT
Historical study of dams conceived in earlier times is essential. To continue advancing, the engineering profession must periodically
review past problems and the lessons that they taught. Candid sharing of information on failures as well as successes is needed. In
fact, some of the most valuable learning has come from projects where errors have been clear in retrospect. In recent years, dam
safety has drawn increasing attention from the public. This is because floods resulting from breaching of dams can lead to devastating
disasters with tremendous loss of life and property, especially in densely populated areas. Past dam failure disasters showed that the
loss of life in the event of a dam failure is directly related to the warning time available to evacuate the population at risk downstream
of the dam. Earth and rock fill dams are widely used throughout the world, and most of the dam failures involve such dams. To speak
about failures of dams without a brief account of these happenings in the dam world is not possible. Therefore, it is essential to go
through the case histories of such dam failures to understand the causes of failures of the dams failed in the past. The main causes of
failures of such dams are attributed to overtopping, internal erosion and piping. There are excellent sources and case studies are
available in the literature related to failure of the earthen dams due to overtopping, internal erosion and piping. The purpose of this
paper is to highlight the most promising causes of the earthen dam failures and present the case histories of the dams failed in the
world due to these causes. The case histories reported in this paper are chosen not for the entity of the damage occurred, but are
representative of the body of knowledge that has been accumulated in the interest of the future safety of dams.

1. INTRODUCTION
Table 1 Classification of prediction
Case histories in geotechnical engineering serve a number of
useful purposes, one of which is to provide real data against
which designers can test their predictions of behavior. There is
ample evidence to indicate that, despite the many advances
made in geotechnical engineering and engineering science in
the past the designer’s ability to predict the behavior of
designed structures accurately has not increased. The reasons
for this apparent lack of improvement are numerous, and
perhaps it will always be as difficult to make accurate
geotechnical predictions as it is to make predictions of human
behavior.
In considering predictions related to geotechnical engineering,
Lambe (1973) classified the predictions as shown in Table 1.
Our professional literature contains the results of more type C1
predictions than of any other type. Autopsies can of course be
very helpful in contributing to our knowledge. However, one
must be suspicious when an author uses type C1 predictions to
‘prove’ that any prediction technique is correct.
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Prediction type
A
B
B1
C
C1

When prediction
made
Before event
During event
During event
After event
After event

Results at time
prediction made
----Not known
Known
Not known
Known

In an attempt to present the type C1 predictions, this paper
considers a number of case histories related to embankment
dam failures. Failure of a dam can result in a major disaster
with devastating losses of both human life and property. The
phenomenon is time-dependent, multiphase (water-soil
interaction), and non-homogeneous (different materials,
various degrees of soil compaction, and so on). Hydraulics,
hydrology, sediment transport mechanism, and structural and
geotechnical aspects are all involved in dam failures. Erosion
of an earth-dam can be primed by low or weak points on the
crest or on the downstream face, by piping or overtopping.
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Progressive erosion then widens and deepens the breach,
increasing outflow and erosion rate.
Internal erosion and piping has historically resulted in about
0.5% (1 in 200) earthen dams failing, and 1.5% (1 in 60)
experiencing a piping incident. Of these failures and accidents,
about half are in the embankment, 40% in the foundations, and
10% from the embankment to foundation (Foster et al. 1998,
2000a, b). Fewer incidents of piping in the foundation, and
particularly from embankment to foundation, progress to
failure, than for piping in the embankment. About two thirds
the failures occur on first filling or in the first five years of the
operation.
A number of studies have been devoted to investigating dam
failures. Research on failure case histories and the resulting
evolution of safety philosophy and practice is, and continues
to be, a very dynamic process. Any advance in it provides
answers to some pending questions, while others remain open
and new ones are coming up. It cannot be possible to speak
about failures of dams without a brief account of these
happenings in the dam world.
In this paper an attempt has been made to discuss the main
causes of failure of earthen dams - overtopping, internal
erosion and piping and present the case histories of the earthen
dams failed in the world due to these causes. The case
histories reported in this paper are chosen not for the entity of
the damage occurred, but for their representative
characteristics.

2. MAIN CAUSES OF EMBANKMENT DAMS
FAILURE
From the above discussion it is apparent that the main causes
of failures of embankment dams are closely related to the
erosion of embankment materials caused by either overtopping
or seepage erosion/piping. Ralston (1987) discussed the
mechanism of embankment erosion from overtopping. For
non-cohesive embankments, materials are removed from the
embankment in layers by tractive stresses. The erosion process
from overtopping begins at a point where the tractive shear
stress exceeds a critical resistance that keeps the material in
place. For cohesive embankments, breaching takes place by
head cutting. Usually, a head cut initiates near the downstream toe of the dam, and then advances upstream until the
crest of the dam is breached. The basic erosion mechanisms
and erosion rate as pointed out by Singh (1996) are different
for granular and cohesive embankments. For granular
embankments, surface slips take place quickly due to the
seepage existing on the downstream slope; and hence granular
materials are removed rapidly layer by layer. For cohesive
embankments, no seepage exists on the slope because of the
low permeability. Instead, erosion often begins at the
embankment toe and advances upstream, undercutting the
slope and in turn causing the removal of large chunks of
materials due to tensile or shear failure of the soil on the oversteepened slope.
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Other than overtopping, internal erosion and piping are
another common mode of failures of embankment dams.
Piping phenomenon as defined by ASTM (2002) is the
progressive removal of soil particles from a mass by a
percolating water, leading to the development of channels.
According to McCook (2004), seepage erosion occurs when
the water flowing through cracks or defect erodes the soil
from the walls of the crack or defect. Internal erosion and
piping can be divided into four phases: initiation and
continuation of erosion, progression to form a pipe and
formation of a breach (Fell et al., 2003). In general, the
seepage erosion/piping failure initiates when the
erosion/piping resistant forces are smaller than the
erosion/piping driving forces, resulting in the removal of soil
particles through large voids or existing discontinuities in soil.
After a large amount of embankment materials has been
washed away by seeping flow, a free path named “pipe” is
formed through the dam. Then, the erosion advances quite
rapidly until the portion of the materials above the pipe
becomes unstable and collapses. After the collapse, the
subsequent erosion proceeds in the same fashion as in the case
of overtopping (Xu and Zhang, 2009).

3. FAILURE CAUSED BY OVERTOPPING
Overtopping is by far one of the most frequent causes of dam
failures, in particular for embankment dams. When
overtopping hits embankment dams, the effects can turn into
disasters. According to the international committee on large
dams (ICOLD, 1995), and the work of Foster et al. (2000), one
–third or more of the total identified failures was caused by
dam overtopping. Overtopping of a dam is generally the
consequence of an extreme flood event and is often a
precursor of partial or complete dam failure. The analysis of
case histories of this cause of dam failure reveals the
inadequacy of formerly used hydrological methods to estimate
extreme floods and the specifications for the selection of the
spillway design conditions. Recently the advances on
hydrology and on climatic processes have allowed obtaining
better estimations of extreme flood events with a reduction of
overtopping occurrence. Hence, hydrological reliable data are
essential for dam safety and criteria of minimum risk have to
be assumed in the evaluation of the design flood.
In this section, three case histories of earthen dam failures due
to overtopping are briefly presented. Failures of these dams
are related to the undersize of outlets and spillways, flood
gates operation and human errors.

3.1 Belci Dam Failure
The Belci dam, a clay core earth-fill structure provided by an
upstream concrete facing, was built in 1962 on Tazlaur River,
near Slobozia in Romania (Diacon et al., 1992; Vogel, 1993).
This dam was 18.5 m high, 432 m long earthen structure with
a storage capacity of 12.7 Mm3. The hydrological
measurements for the estimation and pre-calculation of design
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floods for this dam had only been collected from a gauging
station 10 km upstream from the dam site for ten years prior to
construction. During its 29 years of operation, floods occurred
on Tazlaur River with peak values much more than those
estimated at Belci dam. On 7 July 1970 a peak inflow of 980
m3/sec caused overtopping of the dam and part of the left
wing was eroded. After further floods on 29 May 1971 and in
August 1979 with peak values of 890m3/sec and 855m3/sec
respectively, a new calculation for the design floods was
commissioned. However the spillway capacity was never
changed because at the same time the risk classification of the
dam was reduced.
On 28 July 1991 heavy rainfall occurred, which caused the
failure of main telephone lines and power supply. Due to
failure of the main telephone lines no prediction of flood
warnings could be sent from the upstream catchment areas to
the dam site. The bottom outlet could not be opened more than
40cm due to power failure at the site. Emergency power was
also unavailable and the gates could not be opened manually
as timber and debris were blocking the bottom outlet. At 02.15
am on 29 July the dam began to overtop and the reservoir was
emptied by 07.15 am. Twenty five people were killed by the
flood wave caused by the dam break and 119 houses were
destroyed.
The peak inflow of 1200 m3/sec measured by a water gauge
located at downstream was lower than the later estimated 1-in100-year flood of 1515 m3/sec. The initial dam break occurred
at the same point where the dam had been affected by erosion
in 1970. The final size of the breach was about 112 m long
and 15 m deep (fig.1). Post-failure measurements of the intact
dam crest near this initial break showed that the repair works
had produced the effect of a natural overflow section. A cable
trench that had been dug along the dam crest also had a
negative and accelerating influence with regards to the process
and dynamics of the breach formation. The dam has not been
reconstructed.

was designed and built as a flood defense structure being also
used for regulation and irrigation. Its construction was started
in 1958 following a project of a concrete dam 80 m tall.
During foundation works geotechnical conditions revealed a
problem and construction was stopped in 1964. It was
continued in 1974 with a modified project, in which the
central part had been changed to loose material design with
clay core and finally finished in 1978. It was earth-gravity
dam 70 m tall with 400 m crest length. The dam was provided
with radial gates to regulate the spillway whose capacity was
7000 m3/s; the bottom outlet had a capacity of 250m3/s.
During October 19 and specially 20, 1982, heavy rain took
place in the Jùcar basin close to Tous dam. Heaviest rain was
recorded in the Cofrentes area, about 25 km north-west of
Tous dam. Total rainfall in Cofrentes exceeded 550 mm with
285 mm falling in only 3 hours. The estimated inflow was
5000 m3/s and the gates of the spillway were to be opened.
Unfortunately, the electric network was out of order due to the
weather conditions; moreover, of the two emergency diesel
generators, one was under repair and the other could not be
started. Efforts to raise the gates manually were fruitless.
The overtopping started at 17.00 pm; the water overcame the
dam reaching about 1.10 m above the crest at 19.15 pm. About
16 h after recognizing the impossibility of overtopping the
flood gates, the dam was overtopped and washed out after 1 h
by erosion of a greater part of the shoulders and of the central
rock-fill. After such an extraordinary flood, in the downstream
basin 8 people lost their lives and about 100,000 people had to
be evacuated. The damages were estimated to reach 400 M$,
even if part of these damages were likely to be caused by the
floods before the arrival of the break wave (fig. 2).
A new Tous dam was built on the same site and part of the
clayey core material, which had shown a relatively high
resistance to water flow, was reused for constructing the new
dam.

Fig. 1. The Belci dam after failure.
3.2 Tous Dam Collapse
Tous dam was a 70 m high rockfill dam with a central clay
core located near Valencia, Spain, failed due to overtopping. It
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Fig. 2. The Tous dam after failure.
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3.3 Taum Sauk Dam Failure
The Taum Sauk dam (upper reservoir) suffered failure on 14
December, 2005, located in Missouri State (USA), is part of a
pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant which was
constructed from 1960-1962 and began operation in 1963. The
lower reservoir was formed by constructing a 60 feet high
concrete gravity dam along the East Fork of the Black River 3
miles upstream of Lesterville, MO. The upper reservoir was
sited on Proffit Mountain, approximately 800 feet above the
lower reservoir and connected by a 7,000 feet long tunnel. The
majority of the upper reservoir’s rockfill embankment appears
to have been constructed through simple end dumping of the
excavated material. High rates of settlement were experienced
at the upper reservoir during the first four and a half years of
operation and it continued up to the time of failure in
December 2005, with differential settlements approaching two
feet along the crest of the reservoir’s parapet wall. Since its
construction, the reservoir suffered minor leaks that were
reduced when in 2004 a geo-synthetic liner was installed on
the upstream facing of the dam.
A variety of design/construction flaws, instrumentation error,
and human errors contributed to a catastrophic failure of the
upper reservoir on Dec 14, 2005. Malfunctioning and
improperly programmed/placed sensors failed to indicate that
the reservoir was full and didn’t shut down the facility’s
pumps until water had been overflowing for 5-6 minutes. This
overflow undermined the parapet wall and scoured the
underlying embankment, leading to a complete failure within
5-6 minutes due to overtopping. Figure 3 shows the breach
through embankment of the dam. The peak flow from this
event is estimated at 289,000 cfs.

4. FAILURE CAUSED BY INTERNAL EROSION IN
THE DAM BODY AND FOUNDATION
Internal erosion and piping through a dam body or its
foundation is one of the most important factors which define
the safety structural condition and can represent a serious
source of troubles. Piping can occur in the embankment,
through the foundation and from the embankment into the
foundation as a progression of internal erosion caused by
seepage. In the case of piping failure, the incidence of piping
through the embankment is two times higher than piping
through the foundation and twenty times higher than piping
from the embankment into the foundation (Foster et al., 2000).
Further, it was noticed that half of all piping failures through
the embankment are associated with the presence of conduits.
The different modes of piping associated with conduits are
piping into the conduit, along and above the conduit or out of
the conduit (Fell et al., 2005). Other than conduit the internal
erosion in the dam body can be caused by settlement cracks or
even passages created by animals. Any leakage does not have
to be underestimated and has to be carefully detected since
quick erosion may increase initial minor defects and can
become potentially dangerous. In this section the case history
of Teton dam and Baldwin Hills dam failures due to erosion in
the dam body and foundation respectively are briefly
presented.

4.1 Teton Dam Failure
Teton Dam, a 93 m (305 ft.) high with a crest length of 975 m
(3200 ft) earth fill dam across the Teton River in Madison
County, southeast Idaho, failed completely during first filling
at 11:57 AM on June 5, 1976. The water surface was 9 m
below the crest of the dam. Failure was initiated at 7.30 AM
by a large leak near the right (northwest) abutment of the dam,
about 39 m (130 ft) below the crest. The structure was
breached 4.30 h later as a result of internal erosion (Fig. 4),
causing the loss of 11 lives and extensive flooding in the
farmland and towns below the dam. Peak flow at the time of
breaching was estimated at 42,500 m3/s.
The dam, designed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, failed
just as it was being completed and filled for the first time. This
failure of a modern dam so soon after construction was a
shock to the engineering community. It prompted one of the
most intensive investigations of any dam failure. A panel of
experts investigated that the failure of dam was related to
erosion and piping phenomena which occurred in the key
trench fill on the right abutment possibly caused by seepage
through cracks.

Fig. 3. Breach through Taum Sauk embankment
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission found guilty
owner’s of the dam for his decision to continue operating the
dam despite knowing the malfunctioning of the sensors and
fined $15 million; the largest fine ever accessed by the agency.
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The expert’s panel supposed that the seepage occurred due to
either deficiencies of grouting in the sealing of rock joints or
differential settlements in the key trench fill itself, or a
combination of both causes. Further investigations carried out
on the remains of the left embankment detected the presence
of ‘wet seams’ (horizontal lenses varied in thickness from 75
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to 200 mm) in some of the construction layers. Such wet
seams possibly caused by the unsuccessful attempts to mix dry
and wet soils during the construction of core layers, thus
creating low-density zones undetected during the earth work
controls. The seepage through the key trench fill could have
been the seat of intense flow leading to erosion and piping of
the core.
Among the deficiencies of the design, one particularly relevant
aspect was the lack of an appropriate defensive technical
solution able to cope with the possible different modes of
failure. Moreover, the needs of an effective control during the
different construction phases have to be once more
emphasized.

Fig. 4. The Teton dam after failure.
Investigations by commissions and boards together with
recriminations, typical of most disasters, followed the failure
of Teton Dam. Lessons were learned, but no attempt has been
made to rebuild the dam. Its remnant sits today in silent
testimony that "Nature bats last."

4.2 Baldwin Hills Dam Failure
The Baldwin Hills reservoir was a basin having four sides,
carved and constructed on the top of the highest hill in the
north-west-south-west chain of ridges in Los Angeles
Country, known as the Newport-Inglewood (ICOLD, 1974).
The reservoir, approximately rhomboid in shape, consisted of
compacted earth dykes on three sides, whereas the fourth and
north side was closed by the main dam, 71 m high with a crest
length of 198 m, designed as a homogeneous earth fill. The
construction of the reservoir started in January 1947 and was
placed in service in 1951 with a purpose of providing water to
the northwest part of the city of Los Angeles. The reservoir
had a storage capacity of 1.1 Mm3 and was served by inlet and
outlet conduits in tunnels through east side. An impervious
compacted clay blanket was used to cover all excavated slopes
and constructed embankments. The blanket was 10 feet thick
on the reservoir floor, tapering up the slopes to a lesser
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thickness. Under the blanket there was a four inch thick
porous concrete drainage layer which was placed over an
asphalt seal coating.
After 12 years of operation, on December 14, 1963, at about
11:15 A.M., an unprecedented flow of water was heard in the
spillway pipe at Baldwin Hills Dam. The water came from
drains under the reservoir lining. At approximately 1:00 P. M.,
muddy leakage was discovered downstream from the east
abutment of the dam, which formed the north side of the
reservoir. At 2:20 P. M. lowering of the reservoir water level
revealed a 3-ft-wide break in the reservoir's inner lining. A
futile attempt was made to plug the hole with sandbags. Water
broke violently through the downstream face of the dam. By
5:00 P.M., the reservoir had emptied, revealing a crack in the
lining extending across the reservoir bottom in line with the
breach in the dam (Fig. 5).
Mr. R. B. Jansen, Chairman Engineering Board of Inquiry
Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure, immediately after failure of
the dam constituted a panel of experts to investigate the cause
of failure of the dam. Expert’s panel in his investigation report
stated that a gradual deterioration of the foundation took place
during the life of structure and culminated with sudden failure
on December 14, 1963. The porous concrete drain was
damaged by early small movements at the fault, and leakage
water found its way into the fault. These earth movements
were mainly caused by land subsidence, locally concentrated
along the fault which was a weak plane. During the life of the
reservoir, erosion took place in the fault under the undamaged
blanket and partially damaged drain. The narrow width of the
fault permitted the porous concrete drain to span openings that
were developing under the drain. These occurrences were
gradual and progressive. The perviousness of the fault
permitted the water to disappear into the hill without emerging
on the downstream abutment. Movement occurred at the fault
on December 14, rupturing the impervious blanket and
admitting full reservoir pressure to the fault and to the
drainage system for the first time. The full reservoir pressure
in the fault forced an outlet to the surface at a point low down
on the east abutment of the main dam. Flow developed in the
pervious and erodible fault zone and foundation rock. The
flow and erosion increased rapidly, a cavernous opening piped
through the abutment, the overlying foundation and
embankment collapsed into this opening and the reservoir
drained quickly and completely.
In summary, the reservoir and its immediate environs were
subjected to many adverse forces, including horizontal and
vertical displacement due to subsidence; local breaking of the
weak foundation; some erosion at the faults and rebound
effects due to oil field re-pressurization, reservoir loading and
unloading in 1951 and 1957, and the final inrush of water into
the Fault I-II zone at time of failure.
From the time it was placed into service in 1951, Baldwin
Hills Reservoir had been regarded as a model of engineering
excellence and a source of pride to its builder and owner, the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. In spite of
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careful design, construction and constant surveillance, the
reservoir failed, and lessons are to be learned from the failure.
Facing the same site conditions now, and equipped with the
knowledge of what went wrong at Baldwin Hills, designers
could make several improvements. The obvious first step
would be to avoid rigid drains so close to the water face and to
the unstable and erodible foundation. Drains should be amply
sized and provided with access, where possible, to facilitate
maintenance, and earth linings should have appreciable
plasticity. Erodible embankment and foundation elements
must have adequate filter protection. Foundations in erodible

criteria and have been taken into account within national
legislations devoted to dam safety and international
recommendations that represent a reference to the whole dam
engineering community.
Throughout the world, legislation and safety criteria for dams
vary quit significantly. For public safety along the valley
downstream of dams as well as for the protection of
economical and environmental resources, the majority of the
contemporary safety legislation and technical guidelines
promote and support dam-break flood risk management is
practical and important issue.
Despite the increasing safety of dams due to improved
engineering knowledge and better construction quality, a full
non-risk guarantee is not possible and an accident can occur,
triggered by natural hazards, human actions or just because the
dam is losing strength capacity due to its age.
To mitigate the dam-break risk enforcement of safety control
measures at dam site, implementation of emergency planning
and preparedness measures in the downstream valley, early
warning system, rescue and relief measures are essential.
Emergency planning and effective warning systems are now
mandatory issues in modern dam safety regulations. However,
these measures need to be implemented with support of local
authorities and adequate public information and participation.
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